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Abstract  
We study the product and process innovation choice of firms in which a managerial incentive à 
la Vickers (1985) is present. Taking a two-stage dynamic game approach, we show that 
managerial firms are led to over-invest in process innovation, as compared to standard profit-
maximising firms, while they under-invest in product innovation. The reason is that process 
innovation allows to decrease cost, and this is consistent with a convenient increase in the 
production level. On the opposite, product innovation allows increasing price, which is in 
contrast with the taste for output expansion embodied in the objective function of firms run by 
managers. Preliminary empirical evidence on Italian companies suggests that in fact the 
managerial nature of firm associates with significantly smaller efforts in product innovation 
while the effect on process innovation is positive but non-significant. 
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Managerial incentive and the firms’ propensity to 
invest in product and process innovation  
 
Abstract  - We study the product and process innovation choice of firms in which a 
managerial incentive à la Vickers (1985) is present. Taking a two-stage dynamic 
game approach, we show that managerial firms are led to over-invest in process 
innovation, as compared to standard profit-maximising firms, while they under-
invest in product innovation. The reason is that process innovation allows to 
decrease cost, and this is consistent with a convenient increase in the production 
level. On the opposite, product innovation allows increasing price, which is in 
contrast with the taste for output expansion embodied in the objective function of 
firms run by managers. Preliminary empirical evidence on Italian companies 
suggests that in fact the managerial nature of firm associates with significantly 
smaller efforts in product innovation while the effect on process innovation is 
positive but non-significant. 
[JEL Codes: D43, D23 C72, O31, O32] 
[Keywords : Process innovation; Product innovation; R&D; Managerial incentive] 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In this paper, we study the optimal decisions of managerial firms concerning the efforts 
devoted to, respectively, product and process innovations. According to the seminal 
model introduced by Baumol (1958), subsequently revisited by Vickers (1985), 
Ferhstman and Judd (1987) and several others, we assume that the objective function 
of managers takes into account both the levels of profits and output. From two simple 
theoretical frameworks based on well-known two-stage games, we show that a 
managerial company, as compared to a standard profit maximising firm, ascribes a 
greater importance to process innovations and tends to under-invest in product 
innovations. What the two alternative models have in common is the assumption that 
firms aim at maximising an objective function featuring a linear combination of profits 
and output level. Following Vickers (1985), the weight associated to the output goal 
can be interpreted as a ‘managerial incentive’. In the first model, we investigate 
process innovation in the form of R&D efforts aimed at reducing marginal production 
costs, nesting into a well established literature stemming from d'Aspremont and 
Jacquemin (1988). In the second, we describe product innovation in the form of quality 
improvements, in a vertically differentiated duopoly whose main features are known 
since Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979) and Shaked an Sutton (1982).  
 We show that the higher is the managerial incentive, the higher is the 
investment in process innovation and the lower is that devoted to product innovation. 
The intuitive explanation from these results is as follows. In view of the managerial 
preference for output expansion, process innovation is definitely attractive as it turns 
into an increase of the innovator's market share, all else equal. That is, the innovating 
firm easily (and fully) internalises the benefits of its investment. This is not true for 
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product innovation, though, as it spills over to the rival and largely replicates the 
features of a public good. Adding up to the fact that any increase in quality brings 
about an increase in price, which in turn entails a decrease in output in contrast with 
managerial preferences, the lack of full appropriability reduces the managerial firm's 
incentive to carry out product innovation as compared to a pure profit-seeking unit. 
 The above theoretical conclusions are supported by preliminary evidence 
coming from a sample of Italian manufacturing firms. Such a sample is composed of 
medium-sized and large firms which are distinguished according to their managerial 
nature. Small firms are not taken into account because in their case ownership and 
control tend to be overlapped and it does not make sense to distinguish the few that are 
ruled by managers.  
After controlling for relevant variables that may influence the prevailing type of 
innovative activity at firm level, we find that the managerial nature of firms exerts a 
quite different impact on the probability of introducing product and process 
innovations. The former is significantly lower for the firms that are run by managers 
while for that concerned with process innovations the ‘managerial’ effect, although 
positive, turns out to be not statistically significant. 
 To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to study the bearings of 
managerial preferences on firms' propensity to invest in product or process innovations. 
Most of the available theoretical and empirical studies focus on the role exerted by firm 
size or markets' features. Yin and Zuscovitch (1998) study the relative convenience of 
product and process innovations and show that the efforts devoted to the latter rise with 
the size of firms. The relative profitability of product innovations, instead, has been 
found to increase with the size of markets (Rosenkranz, 2003) or the degree of product 
differentiation (Weiss, 2003). With respect to the empirical evidence, the firm size 
emerges as a key variable in explaining the extent of R&D expenditures devoted to 
process innovations. According to Cohen and Klepper (1996), who provide evidence 
on US firms, this finding is mainly ascribable to the fact that large companies are able 
to spread the cost advantages due to process innovations on higher volumes of output. 
Similar evidence is provided by Fritsch and Meschede (2001) for Germany, and Parisi 
et al. (2006) who estimate the probabilities of introducing product and process 
innovations by Italian manufacturing firms. 
Our empirical analysis shows that, when  the results are controlled for industry 
fixed effects, the size of firms does not significantly affect the relative propensity to 
introduce product and process innovations. The latter, however, is higher for the firms 
belonging to industries that rely particularly on scale economies. Obviously, the 
probability of investing in product innovations depends on industry characteristics too, 
but we find that it is significantly lower when companies are run by managers who, 
according to our model, are less prone to innovate products. 
The theoretical findings and the empirical evidence provided in this paper offer 
additional insights in the long-standing debate – dating back to Schumpeter (1942) and 
Arrow (1962) –  on the relationships between firm size and market structure on the one 
side and innovation efforts on the other. Along with other factors, we contend that the 
above relationships can also be shaped by the managerial nature of firms.  
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The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical 
models. Section 3 is devoted to the empirical analysis based on a wide sample of 
Italian manufacturing firms. Conclusions and comments are gathered in Section 4. 
 
 
2. Models 
 
In order to investigate the interplay between strategic delegation and managerial 
incentives to invest in process and product innovation, we employ two well known 
models that have been widely debated in the existing literature. The first, featuring 
investments in process innovation, dates back to d'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988);1 
the second, illustrating firms' incentives to increase product quality, can be traced back 
to Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979, 1980) and Shaked and Sutton (1982, 1983). In both 
settings, we focus our attention on non-drastic innovations. 
 
2.1 Process innovation 
We consider a situation in which two firms, 1 and 2, compete on a market for 
differentiated products. The utility function of the representative consumer is 
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as in Spence (1976) and Singh and Vives (1984), inter alia. Parameter s measures the 
degree of substitutability between the two varieties, so that they are identical if s=1, 
and completely independent of each other if s=0. Market competition takes place à la 
Cournot and the (inverse) demand functions faced by the two firms are respectively: 
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The production of goods entails a constant unit cost, according to the cost function 
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In a pre-market stage, firms may carry out R&D investments for innovation. Process 
innovation entails a unit cost reduction (as in the literature deriving from the seminal 
                                                 
1 See also Kamien et al. (1992) and Suzumura (1992), inter alia. 
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paper by d'Aspremont and Jaquemin, 1988). We denote the investment effort by ki 
(i=1,2). Thus, R&D activities devoted to process innovation mean that the relevant 
(total) cost function borne by firm i looks as follows: 
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where )( ji kkc β−−  is firm i’s marginal production cost, b>0 is a parameter scaling the 
R&D cost and ]1,0[∈β  measures the degree of technological spillovers characterising 
the R&D activity within the industry. 
Finally, we assume that both firms are run by managers, who derive positive 
utility from the level of production in itself, so that the objective function of each firm 
is assumed to be 
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where iπ  denotes profit (revenues minus total costs, measured by (5)) and the term iQθ  
(with 0≥θ ) captures the managers’ love for production, or –using the label proposed 
by Vickers (1985) – it represents the “managerial incentive”. It is worth mentioning that 
a strand of literature starts from the seminal papers by Vickers (1985) and Fershtman 
and Judd (1987); in these models, managers aim at maximising a weighted average of 
profits and either sales or revenues, while the delegation contract for managers is 
written in such a way that the managerial incentive is ‘optimally’ set so as to maximise 
the stockholders' profits. Clearly, in the limiting case where 0=θ , we are back to the 
benchmark setup with purely profit-maximising firm. 
 In what follows, we shall take the extent of delegation as given, i.e., we will treat 
θ as an exogenous parameter in order to study its effects on innovation incentives in 
terms of comparative statics. 
The objective functions of the two firms' managers write as follows: 
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In order to identify the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium of the two-stage game, we 
proceed as usual by backward induction. In the market phase, taking as given the 
investment efforts chosen at the first stage, each firm sets the optimal amount of 
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production, simultaneous to the opponent's choice. From the system of first order 
conditions one derives the pair of optimal outputs: 
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Of course optimal outputs depend on the investment efforts decided upon in the first 
stage of the game. Substituting (9-10) in the objective functions, and taking the first 
derivative w.r.t. k1 and k2  respectively, we can easily find the optimal level of 
symmetric investment efforts: 
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with the corner solution 
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Provided that an interior solution does exist 2 at the first stage of the game, then it is 
immediate to note that 
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This means that the larger is the extent of delegation to managers, the higher will be the 
investment efforts devoted to process innovations. In other words, compared to standard 
profit-oriented firms without any managerial incentive, firms that are run by managers 
interested in expanding output levels will tend to devote a larger amount of resources to 
activities aimed at process innovation. The economic intuition behind this result is quite 
clear, as any reduction in production costs entails, all else equal, an increase in output, 
which in turn is appealing to managers whose objective function is defined as in (6). 
                                                 
2 The condition ensuring positive R&D efforts at the sub-game perfect equilibrium coincides with that 
ensuring the asymptotic stability of the equilibrium itself. See Henriques (1990). 
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This conclusion replicates those of Zhang and Zhang (1997), Kraekel (2004) and 
Kopel and Riegler (2006), where the extent of delegation is exogenously determined 
prior to the R&D stage. 
 
2.2 Product innovation  
The vertical differentiation model we adopt to study product innovation draws upon a 
two-stage game analysed in several contributions (Choi and Shin, 1992; Dutta et al., 
1995; Wauthy, 1996; Lambertini et al., 2002, inter alia). Two single-product firms, 
labelled as H and L, supply goods of qualities 0≥≥> LH qqQ . Consumers are 
uniformly distributed with density equal to one over the interval  ],1[ Θ−Θ , with 1>Θ . 
Therefore, the size of the total population of consumers is equal to Θ  . Each consumer 
is indexed by a marginal willingness to pay for quality ],1[ Θ−Θ∈ϑ , and either buys 
one unit of the vertically differentiated good or doesn't buy at all. His net utility from 
consumption is:  
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where pi is the price of the good supplied by firm i. 
 For the sake of simplicity, all variable production costs are assumed to be nil, 
while quality improvements involve a convex R&D effort )( ii qψ . This, in addition to 
ensuring the concavity of the objective function w.r.t. the quality level, also involves the 
presence of decreasing returns to R&D efforts for quality improvements. It is sensible to 
assume that a higher quality requires a higher R&D effort, and therefore we pose 
)()( LLHH qq ψψ > .  
The market demand functions for the two goods are:  
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where Hϑ  is the marginal willingness to pay for quality characterising the consumer 
who is indifferent between qH and qL at the price vector {pH, pL}, i.e., it is the solution 
to:  
 
LH
LH
HLLLHHH qq
pppqpq −
−=⇔−=− ϑϑϑ)16(  
 
8 
while Lϑ  is the marginal evaluation of quality associated with the consumer who is 
indifferent between buying the low quality good and not buying at all,  ./ LLL qp=ϑ  
Productions’ levels turn out to be 
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while firms' profits, net of R&D costs, are:  
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As in the previous model, also here the delegation contract allows for the 
assignment of an extra weight to sales, so that the managers of firm i wants to maximise  
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In this case we allow for different managerial incentives, i.e., LH θθ ≠ , in view of the ex 
ante asymmetry between the two firms. Again, we take iθ  as exogenously given. 
From the first order condition on prices: 
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we obtain the following Nash equilibrium prices, given the vectors of qualities and 
delegation parameters: 
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 The solution of the quality stage cannot be worked out analytically;3 nevertheless, one 
can resort to the implicit function theorem to highlight that 
 
i
i
i
i
i
i q
q
pp
θθ ∂
∂⋅∂
∂=∂
∂)24(  
 
and therefore 
 




∂
∂
∂
∂=



∂
∂
i
i
i
i
i
i
q
ppsignqsign /)25( θθ  
 
Observe that, all else equal, any increase in quality brings about an increase in price, 
i.e., 0/ >∂∂ ii qp , and expressions (22-23) yield 
0)4/(2// <−−=∂∂=∂∂ LHHLLHH qqqpp ϑϑ . This ultimately implies 0/ <∂∂ iiq θ , 
i=H,L. 
The intuition behind the negative relationship emerging between the effort to 
increase product quality and the extent of managerial delegation can be grasped by 
observing that, for any given level of the rival's quality, any increase in quality by firm i 
produces (i) a positive externality to the opponent, via the increase in product 
differentiation, which mimics the features typically associated to public goods; and (ii) a 
decrease in market share via the increase in price, which is in contrast with the taste for 
output expansion embodied in the objective function.  
 Summing up the foregoing analysis, there neatly emerges that the taste for 
expanding production levels leads managers to over-invest in process innovations and 
under-invest in product innovations as compared to what would be the outcome of pure 
profit-seeking behaviour.4 In the presence of separation between ownership and control, 
firms run by managers are more keen on increasing the output levels (by fully 
internalising the beneficial effects of process innovation), while having little or no 
motivations to foster product innovation. In other words, the separation between 
ownership and control leads firms to increase output levels, given the structure of 
managerial incentives. If the (constant) operative cost is given, this means lower profit 
levels and lower amount of resources devoted to product innovation. On the contrary, if 
the operative cost is endogenous, and depends on the efforts in process innovation, a 
manager has further reasons to aim at attaining a lower marginal cost, since this permits 
him to further increase the output level. 
 
                                                 
3 Due to the presence of the delegation parameter iθ , this holds irrespective of the specific form of the 
cost function )( ii qψ , even in the simplest case where it is nil. 
4 A result with a similar flavour emerges in Cellini and Lambertini (2008), where a differential game 
approach is taken. 
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3. Empirical evidence 
 
3.1 Data base, definition of variables and descriptive statistics 
The data we consider for the empirical analysis, come from the Survey on 
Manufacturing Firms (Indagine sulle imprese manifatturiere), currently conducted in 
Italy by UniCredit (formerly, by Mediocredito Centrale and Capitalia). Specifically, we 
consider the last wave of the survey carried out in 2004 and referring to the period 
2001-2003.  
Such a survey is based upon questionnaire submitted to all the Italian 
manufacturing firms with more than 500 employees and to a stratified sample of firms 
below such a threshold but with more than 9 employees. In total, the firms included in 
the last wave were 3452.  
Although previous editions of the same survey are available in digital formats 
and have been used in a number of empirical works (see, among the most recent ones, 
Parisi et al., 2006; Hall et al., 2007), we consider here only the last wave simply 
because, for the first time, it provides very detailed information on the composition of 
the firms’ total employment.  
For the specific purpose of our study, the most interesting information refers to 
the presence of three top professional positions: entrepreneurs, family managers and 
external managers. With these data it is possible to find a measure of managerial 
presence and, then, to distinguish managerial firms from those in which the ownership 
is not fully separated from control. 
However, such a distinction makes sense only for companies of medium and 
large size, given that the overwhelming majority of small firms are ruled by 
entrepreneurs who are in charge of both ownership and control. As a consequence, from 
the firms included in the last survey we dropped out those with less than 100 
employees. In doing so, we moved from 3452 to about 860 firms (a finding that 
highlights quite effectively the small average size of Italian manufacturing companies). 
Moreover, for 34 firms, some of the variables needed to perform our empirical analysis 
were missing so that, in the end, our sample reduces to 826 companies of medium and 
large size. 
As already mentioned, for each firm we were able to get the number of 
entrepreneurs, family managers (i.e. belonging to the family that holds the company) 
and external managers. The latter could have an objective function different from that of 
the ownership. Thus, without ambiguity, a proper managerial company can be detected 
if it is fully controlled by external managers. Accordingly, we defined ‘managerial’ all 
the firms in which the following condition is met: 
 
1=++ managersFamilyursEntreprenemanagersExternal
managersExternal   
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that is, family managers and entrepreneurs are absent in the management. 
Although the above criterion seems quite restrictive, we found that 354 out the 
826 firms considered (43%) can be classified as managerial, in this strict sense. As 
expected, the percentage of managerial companies rises when one moves from medium-
sized to large firms (Table 1). In spite of that, it is remarkable that also within the 
medium size class almost one firm out of three is of managerial nature, according to our 
criterion.  
 
Table 1 – Number of firms and percentage of managerial firms by size class 
 Number of 
firms 
Number (and 
percentage) of 
managerial firms  
Medium-sized firms  
(from 100 to 249 employees) 
489 152 (31.1%) 
Large size firms  
(250 and more employees) 
337 202 (59.9%) 
Total 826 354 (43.0%) 
 
 
The second and crucial step in the empirical analysis is represented by the 
measurement of the efforts devoted by each firm to product and process innovations. In 
the UniCredit survey firms were asked to report, with a yes/no answer, whether they 
had introduced product or process innovations, or both, over the period 2001-2003. 
Along with the drawback of measuring the simple presence rather than the extent of 
innovative outputs, the problem of using dichotomous answers is that the majority of 
firms tend to report both product and process innovations.  
In our case, as Table 2 shows, this happens both in the whole sample of medium 
and large firms and in each of the four sectors identified by Pavitt (1984) in his well 
known technological taxonomy of firms5. However, looking at the presence of sole 
product or process innovations, some remarkable differences emerge. In line with the 
expectations, ‘supplier dominated’ and ‘scale intensive’ firms tend to be more engaged 
in process innovations while the opposite occurs to ‘specialised suppliers’ and ‘science 
based’ firms. Note that non-innovative firms (i.e., firms reporting no innovations) 
account for about 31% of the sample, a figure consistent with that arising from the 
previous waves of the UniCredit survey (cf. Parisi et al., 2006); ‘supplier dominated’ 
                                                 
5 According to Pavitt’s taxonomy ‘supplier dominated’ firms (such as those producing traditional 
consumer goods) “make very little contribution themselves either to their product or their process 
technology” since “most innovations come from suppliers of equipment and materials” (Pavitt, 1984, p. 
354). In-house engineering and R&D capabilities are instead stronger in ‘specialised suppliers’ (e.g. firms 
producing specialised machinery, precision instruments and medical equipment) which thrive on product 
innovation. The same applies to ‘scale intensive’ firms which, however, focus on process innovations in 
order to exploit latent economies of scale (the classical examples are the industries of motor vehicles, 
domestic appliances and basic chemicals). Finally, the highest commitment to R&D is recorded in 
‘science based firms’ (such as those producing pharmaceuticals and IT equipments). A table of 
concordance between the Pavitt’s sectors and the NACE three digit codes of manufacturing industries is 
provided by the UniCredit (formerly Capitalia) survey (cf. Capitalia, 2002). 
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and ‘scale intensive’ firms are characterised by above average percentages of non-
innovators (35 and 34 %, respectively). 
 
 
Table 2 – Propensity to product and process innovations according to different types of firms 
  
Total 
firms 
Firms 
reporting 
product 
innovations 
only 
Firms 
reporting 
process 
innovations 
only 
Firms 
reporting 
both product 
and process 
innovations 
Firms with 
positive share 
of total sales 
due to new 
products 
 No. No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Supplier 
dominated 372 49 13 87 23 109 29 160 43
 
Scale intensive 154 15 10 37 24 50 32 69 45
Specialized 
suppliers 253 52 21 34 13 103 41 163 64
 
Science based 47 7 15 4 9 22 47 31 66
 
Total 826 123 15 162 20 284 34 423 51
 
 
The only indicator of quantitative output associated with innovative activities 
that can be obtained from the survey is the share of total sales due to new products 
(referred to the last surveyed year, i.e. 2003). This is an interesting way of measuring 
the extent of a firm’s innovative outputs originally introduced by the first Community 
Innovation Survey (CIS) carried out in 1993 and covering the years 1990-1992 (see 
Eurostat, 1997)6.  
In a recent study based on CIS micro-data, Mohnen et al. (2006, p. 394) argue 
that the share of innovative sales “can be viewed simply as the sales weighted number 
of innovations and seems to be generally well understood by firm respondents. […] Of 
course, such as measure only captures product innovations, but the surveys indicate that 
most firms innovating in processes also innovate in products”. In principle, by means of 
changes in product design and quality, also process innovations may generate new and, 
above all, improved products. However, as far as most of them are devoted to reduce the 
production costs of old products, process innovations do not give rise to new sales. 
Accordingly, it is hard to find a direct indicator of the outcomes of process innovations 
so that they are usually approximated by a dummy variable indicating the mere presence 
of them or by input measures, such as the extent of R&D devoted to new processes 
(Cohen and Klepper, 1997; Fritsch and Meschede, 2001). In our case, product and 
process R&D cannot be distinguished at firm level, so that we are compelled to use only 
a dummy variable for process innovations. 
                                                 
6 Up to now, other three waves of the CIS have been conducted. The last edition (CIS4) refers to 2004.  
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The last column of Table 2 shows that the number of firms with positive share of 
sales associated with new products (423) is even higher than the sum of those reporting 
product innovations only and both types of innovation (404). This discrepancy is 
probably due to the fact that the firms with very small shares of innovative sales did not 
answer positively to the yes/no questions on the types of innovation introduced.  
Although imperfect, the percentage of sales due to product innovations is the 
only indicator we have to distinguish the firms according to the ‘prevalent’ type of 
innovation they are involved in. Among the 423 firms reporting a positive share of 
innovation output, those that declared to have introduced product innovations only can 
be safely classified as firms with a ‘prevalence of product innovation’. Similarly, the 
403 firms that indicated a zero share of innovative sales and reported process 
innovations only can be defined as firms with a ‘prevalence of process innovation’. To 
identify the group in which the firms reporting both product and process innovations 
should be included, we inspected the frequency distribution of the percentages of sales 
due to new products.  
Figure 1 shows that such a distribution is very skewed with 402 out the 826 
firms reporting a zero share of innovative sale and a few firms with shares greater than 
20%. The distribution, however, does not decrease monotonically: after that 
corresponding to zero, there is a second mode at 10%. Another interesting feature of the 
distribution is that the percentages are concentrated on rounded values simply because 
the firm respondents were not able to report precise figures and, then, provided rounded 
estimates of the sales due to new products.  
 
Figure 1 - Frequency distribution of innovation output  (share of sales due to new products) 
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In order to identity the firms particularly involved in product innovations, we 
used two alternative cut points, corresponding to 5 or 9%. Thus, the firms that 
introduced both product and process innovations but reported a share of innovative sales 
above these thresholds are included in the group with a ‘prevalence of product 
innovations’ while the others in the alternative group. At a first sight, the two cut points 
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could seem rather low to detect a priority for product innovations. However, looking at 
the distribution of innovative sales, this is not the case. If, as already said, one considers 
that almost 49% of the firms did report a zero share, by applying the thresholds of 5 and 
9 percentage points it emerges that the firms with a ‘prevalence of product innovations’ 
account, respectively, for 40% and 35% of the sample. By slightly increasing the 
threshold up to 10%, a priority for product innovations would be identified for only 
22% of the sampled firms which, in light of the available evidence, appears too small to 
be a plausible share7. 
By applying the above criteria, table 3 shows the numbers and the percentages of 
firms according to the prevalent type of innovative activities.  It is important to stress 
that the percentages do not sum up to 100 because they refer to the entire sample, 
including also non-innovative firms.    
 
Table 3 – Number and percentage of firms by prevalent type of innovation* 
 Cut point of 5% of innovative sales Cut point of 9% of innovative sales 
 Firms with a 
prevalence of 
product 
innovations  
Firms with a 
prevalence of 
process innovations
Firms with a 
prevalence of 
product 
innovations  
Firms with a 
prevalence of 
process innovations
 No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Supplier dominated 144 38.7 101 27.2 124 33.3 121 32.5
Scale intensive 41 26.6 61 39.6 40 26.0 62 40.3
Specialized 
suppliers 143 56.5 49 19.4 137 54.2 55 21.7
Science based 29 61.7 6 12.8 27 57.4 8 17.0
Total 357 43.2 217 26.2 328 39.7 246 29.9
* The percentages refer to the whole sample of 826 firms. 
 
For the whole sample, a prevalence of product innovations is detected and 
appears particularly strong in ‘science based’ firms and ‘specialized suppliers’. On the 
contrary, ‘scale intensive’ firms are always characterised by a higher propensity for 
process innovations. The case of ‘supplier dominated’ firms is peculiar since they show 
a prevalence of product innovations when the lower threshold of innovative sales is 
used while by adopting the 9% cut point the two types of innovative activity are equally 
important. This is consistent with previous empirical evidence concerned with the 
Italian manufacturing firms producing traditional consumer goods. Many of them have 
a high propensity to innovate productive processes by investing in new machinery and 
equipment and, then, taking advantage of embodied technological change (Santarelli 
                                                 
7 Our conclusion is supported by the fact that the majority of firms’ R&D efforts are concerned with 
product innovations. Cohen and Klepper (1996) found that 72% of the total R&D of the US firms 
included in their sample is devoted to product innovations. The share found by Fritsch and Meschede 
(2001) for a sample of German firms is 61%. 
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and Sterlacchini, 1994). Accordingly, the distinction based on the higher threshold is 
slightly preferable. In any case, since we do not have other strong justifications for 
choosing the less or more restrictive criterion, in the following section we shall perform 
two distinct regression analyses.  
 
3.2 Regression analysis 
This section is devoted to a regression analysis based upon the data illustrated in the 
previous one. Table 4 presents the results arising from Probit regressions with the 
principal aim of testing whether the managerial nature of the firm significantly affects 
the probabilities of being mainly involved in product and process innovations. The 
sample is constituted by the 826 firms described in Section 3.1. 
Obviously, our goal cannot be performed without taking simultaneously into 
account a set of control and behavioural variables that, according to the relevant 
literature, are important for explaining the dependent variable. Thus, among the 
explanatory variables, we inserted three dummy variables for the sectors of Pavitt’s 
taxonomy, along with the constant term, and the log of total sales as a proxy for the size 
of firms.  
Coehn and Klepper (1996) found that, in the US, larger firms are more involved 
in process R&D and contended that this is due to their capability of spreading the R&D 
costs over a greater level of output. Fritsch and Meschede (2001), for a sample of 
German firms, show that both product and process R&D are affected by firm size and 
the difference is not statistically significant. A similar result is found by Parisi et al. 
(2006) who estimate the probabilities of introducing product and process innovations by 
Italian manufacturing firms. In any case, the impact of firm size must be controlled for 
sector specific effects which are likely to capture both technological opportunities and 
appropriability conditions and, thus, should account for a large portion of the variability 
recorded in the propensities to innovate products and processes. The descriptive picture 
provided by Tables 2 and 3 confirms that also in our case the sectoral dimension is 
indeed important. The inclusion of sales among the explanatory variables is similarly 
important especially because we saw that, in our sample, the presence of managerial 
companies tends to rise with firm size (see Table 1). In effect, the correlation coefficient 
between the dummy for managerial firms and the log of total sales is statistically 
significant, although not particularly high (0.365). 
Along with the above mentioned control variables, we inserted in the regressions 
two further variables that capture the extent of innovative efforts (or inputs) undertaken 
by the firms: R&D expenditures and investments in machinery and equipment 
expressed in percentage of total sales. According to the prevailing empirical evidence, 
we expect that the intensity of R&D should be particularly effective in raising the 
propensity to innovate products while that of investment in machinery should mainly 
enhance process innovations (in support of the latter hypothesis see, in particular, Parisi 
et al., 2006). Our estimates confirm the above expectations. Table 4 shows that both the 
intensity of R&D and investment in machinery are highly significant, but the former 
affects exclusively the prevalence of product innovations while the latter only enhances 
that of process innovations. Also sectoral effects turn out to be particularly significant 
and especially in the first panel of regressions based on the 5% threshold of innovative 
sales. ‘Specialised suppliers’ and ‘science based’ firms tend to assign a higher priority 
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to product innovations and, as a consequence, less importance to process innovations. 
The opposite occurs to ‘scale intensive’ firms but only in the second panel of estimates.  
 
 
Table 4 - Probit regression for the prevalent type of innovation 
Dependent variables Prevalence of product 
innovations 
Prevalence of process 
innovations 
 
Cut point of 5% of innovative sales 
 Coefficient Robust Std. 
Error 
Coefficient Robust Std. 
Error 
Constant 0.983 0.774 -1.151 0.830 
Log of total sales -0.075 0.044 0.021 0.047 
R&D expenditures on total sales 
(%) 
0.152 0.036*** -0.026 0.026 
Investment in machinery and 
equipment on total sales (%) 
0.011 0.012 0.048 0.013*** 
Managerial firm  -0.231 0.098** 0.033 0.104 
Scale intensive firm -0.261 0.132** 0.334 0.128*** 
Specialised suppliers firm 0.405 0.108*** -0.228 0.116** 
Science based firm 0.433 0.218** -0.480 0.259* 
Wald χ2 (7) [Prob.> χ2 ] 73.99  [0.000] 36.51  [0.000] 
Log pseudo-likelihood -516.52  -455.87  
 
Cut point of 9% of innovative sales 
 Coefficient Robus Std. 
Error 
Coefficient Robust Std. 
Error 
Constant 1.410 0.782* -1.567 0.810* 
Log of total sales -0.106 0.045** 0.053 0.046 
R&D expenditures on total sales 
(%) 
0.110 0.031*** 0.008 0.023 
Investment in machinery and 
equipment on total sales (%) 
0.006 0.012 0.051 0.013*** 
Managerial firm  -0.206 0.099** 0.001 0.102 
Scale intensive firm -0.122 0.134 0.175 0.127 
Specialised suppliers firm 0.517 0.108*** -0.332 0.114** 
Science based firm 0.527 0.216** -0.562 0.259** 
Wald χ2 (7) [Prob.> χ2 ] 74.90  [0.000] 37.27  [0.000] 
Log pseudo –likelihood -512.22  -483.47  
***=Significant at 0.01 level of confidence. **= Significant at 0.05. *= Significant at 0.10.  
 
 
The size variable has a negative and significant coefficient only when the 
threshold of 9% of innovative sales is adopted suggesting that larger firms tend to 
assign a lower priority to product innovations. By applying the 5% cut point, the log of 
total sales is instead not significant when inserted together with the managerial dummy 
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(see below). Finally, the size of firms is never significant in the regressions concerned 
with process innovations. 
Moving to the variable of major interest for the purposes of our study, the 
dummy for managerial firms (taking the value 1 when the company is fully controlled 
by external managers) exerts a negative and significant impact on the prevalence of 
product innovations, while it is not significant when the prevalence of process 
innovations is the dependent variable.  
The negative coefficient for the managerial nature of firms, in the regression for 
the product innovation, is not substantially affected by the adopted threshold of 
innovative sales. However, due to the correlation with the firm size (see above), the 
managerial dummy’s coefficient would increase from 0.21-0.23 to 0.28 if the log of 
total sales was excluded from the regression. In short, being correlated, both the firm 
size and the presence of full managerial control depress the propensity to be mainly 
engaged in product innovations. However, the managerial dummy exerts a more 
significant impact, especially when the threshold of 5% of innovative sales is 
considered.   
In conclusion, focussing on medium-sized and large Italian companies, we find 
that the managerial nature of firms significantly depresses the probability of introducing 
product innovations,8 while it has a (positive but) non-significant effect on the 
introduction of process innovations, ceteris paribus.  
 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
 
This paper has made a very simple point: managerial firms tend to under-invest in 
product innovation as compared to standard profit-oriented firms, and to over-invest in 
process innovation. This has been modelled in a two-stage game framework, in which 
managerial firms can influence either the production cost (via investment devoted to 
process innovation) or the product quality (via investment devoted to product 
innovation), in a pre-market stage, and then compete on the market in a second phase. 
Our theoretical outcomes find some preliminary support from empirical 
evidence coming from the UniCredit data base on Italian manufacturing firms. In fact, 
our regression analysis has shown that, for a wide sample of medium-sized and large 
companies, the managerial nature of firms significantly affects – negatively – the 
introduction of product innovation. The impact on process innovation is different, since 
the managerial nature exerts a (positive but) not significant effect. 
                                                 
8 To investigate whether the managerial dummy affects, along with the probability, also the extent of 
product innovations we carried out an Interval Regression analysis for the share of sales due to new 
products. We adopted this estimation method because, due to the innovative sales’ distribution (see 
Figure 1, Section 3.1), both the OLS and Tobit procedure are unsuitable. In all the performed regressions, 
we found that the managerial variable has a weak impact on the percentage of sales due to new products. 
In fact, although the managerial dummy turns out to be negative and statistically significant, it does not 
determine a remarkable change in the probability of observing a firm within a particular interval.  
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In sum, the distinction between product and process innovations appears to be 
really relevant from both a theoretical and an empirical standpoint. The extent of these 
different innovative activities has been shown to be influenced also by the presence of 
managerial incentives.  
By introducing this element into the long-standing debate on how firm size and 
market structure affect innovation it is possible to draw interesting implications. On the 
one hand, if we interpreted the extent of managerial incentive as a factor leading to 
harsher market competition – as long as it entails larger levels of production – we 
should conclude that this associates with higher efforts for the R&D devoted to process 
innovation and a lower amount of product R&D, i.e. an Arrovian and a Schumpeterian 
conclusion, respectively. On the other side, at odds with the argument put forward by 
Arrow (1962), a strategic delegation à la Vickers implies that even companies with a 
dominant market position may have an incentive to introduce cost-reducing innovations 
greater than standard competitive firms. In any case, managerial firms, as compared to 
those ruled by entrepreneurs, have lower incentives to undertake efforts for innovating 
products. This is consistent with Winter (1984) who, reconciling the early and late 
works of Schumpeter (1911; 1942), stressed that two different technological regimes 
may coexist or alternate over time: an ‘entrepreneurial regime’ less favourable to large 
established companies and mainly focussed on product innovations and a ‘routinized 
regime’ in which incumbent firms tend to concentrate their efforts on process 
innovations. The prevalence of a given regime over the other can be due to a variety of 
factors such as technological opportunities, appropriability conditions and financial 
constraints (see, among others, Audretsch, 1995; Malerba and Orsenigo, 1997). Along 
with them, we contend that also the extent of managerial incentives may play an 
important role.   
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